“W e must re-do our thinking to save the land,” proclaimed Henry T. McKnight at the 1967 launch of the Jonathan project, “rather than re-do the land to serve us.” Jonathan, a planned residential community located in Carver County, represents well the ideals and limitations of 1960s and 1970s thinking in the United States on questions of development and housing. Conceived at a time of urban problems and rising environmental awareness—and supported by a federal government taking an increasingly active role in new housing—Jonathan registered early successes but ultimately failed to achieve the lofty goals of its visionary founder, businessman and state senator Henry McKnight.¹

In the years after 1945, suburban communities proliferated in America. Between 1950 and 1970 the suburban population doubled, reaching 74 million, as people left cities in record numbers. Minnesota was part of this trend. After decades of growth, both St. Paul and Minneapolis began to lose population in the 1950s, and their losses accelerated in the 1960s. Many departed for booming new communities like Richfield, a bedroom suburb of small, cookie-cutter homes that typified post-1945 growth.²

Small wonder people were leaving American cities by the 1960s. For many, an “urban crisis” of rising crime, falling property values, decaying infrastructure, and racial unrest helped make the new settlements attractive. But suburbs, noted a federal Housing and Urban Development (HUD) official in 1969, too often grew in “a tract by tract, scattered, and disorganized method which results in what is commonly called ‘urban sprawl.’” And, structured around an automobile culture dependent upon ribbons of asphalt wrapped around the land, suburbs also placed enormous strain on the environment in an era of rising awareness about the impact of human beings on their surround-
ings. Beginning in the 1960s, bolder proposals took aim at the so-called urban crisis, advancing new types of housing solutions instead of adding to suburban sprawl.3

The federal government’s involvement in the housing debate allowed some of these ideas to become reality. President Lyndon B. Johnson’s domestic reform package, called the Great Society, targeted both poverty and racial injustice. Housing was a core issue that addressed both of these problems. With two key pieces of legislation—the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965 and the Fair Housing Act of 1968—Johnson expanded government’s role in making housing more affordable and accessible.4

LBJ desired improvement for existing urban and suburban settings, “but there is another way as well which we should encourage and support,” he argued in a February 1968 message to Congress. “It is the new community, freshly designed and built.” The idea of new, or planned, communities dated to colonial times—Philadelphia was an early instance. Twentieth-century examples included the three New Deal-era Greenbelt communities in Maryland, Ohio, and Pennsylvania—public cooperatives built outside metropolitan areas and designed to be self-sufficient—as well as the four postwar Levittowns with their small, homogenous, mass-produced slab homes.5

Certain new communities planned in the 1960s, though, embraced planning but turned away from the standard subdivision. An important early example is Reston in northern Virginia, which was a model for Jonathan. Proclaiming that “a new town can be a better town,” the 1962 Reston master plan emphasized “the kind of life to be lived and the visual character of the community.” The plan called for self-contained communities built in harmony with nature, featuring a high-density core for commerce and service and lower-density housing at the edges; open spaces with lakes and green areas; various styles and sizes of housing, serving different income and age groups; and space reserved for business, to provide employment and a tax base.6

HUD officials, too, moved away from Levittown-style construction, arguing that “the process and results of new community building offer a major, more rational, and more efficient alternative to the usual process of urban development.” But the HUD program for new communities began its existence with a major complication: it never precisely defined just what a new community was. This failure would prove a problem in the not-too-distant future. Nevertheless, by December 1970 federal funding and loan-guarantee programs were in place for four broad types of new communities: freestanding ones, satellites of existing metropolitan areas, extensions of smaller towns, and new-towns-in-town.7

And so, planners, urban scholars, and architects developed—and in some cases, constructed—visions of fundamental and far-reaching change in community design. Scores of groups applied for federal funding, and by 1974 the government had endorsed 15 new community projects, extending loan guarantees to 13. Investment totaled more than $273 million ($1.663 billion in 2013). Of the 15, two were in Minnesota: Cedar-Riverside, a new-town-in-town project in Minneapolis, and the freestanding community of Jonathan.8

Jonathan got its start in 1965 when McKnight, a wealthy Minneapolis businessman, conservationist, and state senator, gradually began to acquire more than 3,000 acres of land north of Chaska in Carver County. This gently rolling countryside with farms, lakes, and wooded areas was sparsely settled: the 1960 census counted fewer than 22,000 people in the entire county.9

McKnight’s goal was to construct a new town in the style of Reston; he had visited the Virginia community more than once and greatly admired it. Indeed, a comparison of the Reston master plan and the original Jonathan design demonstrates how much McKnight was inspired by...
By 1970 McKnight’s land holdings for Jonathan would grow to more than 8,000 acres. Here, he proclaimed, would arise a comprehensively planned and aesthetically appealing city for 50,000 residents, featuring housing for multiple income groups, plenty of jobs, tax-paying businesses, and green, open spaces. To set these plans in motion, he brought together a group of mostly local businessmen as investors and in 1967 established the Jonathan Development Corporation (JDC) to oversee general development. McKnight served as chairman of the board. In addition to the JDC, the business model included a land-acquisition firm, Ace Development Corporation, and Carver Company, a partnership between McKnight and the JDC.

The plans for Jonathan were bold and ambitious, matching the personality of its founder. McKnight drove himself hard and wanted to be involved in literally all aspects of “his” project. When visitors arrived, for example, he seemed omnipresent: at one moment in business attire presenting to potential investors, at another wearing jeans and a hardhat, astride a bulldozer, or leading tours for prospective homebuyers.

Three key concepts, all hallmarks of the new-community movement, were central to plans for Jonathan, according to a 1971 promotional book, *Jonathan. New Town: Design and Development*. First and foremost: ecological balance. Planning should “encompass man and his environmental needs without destroying the existing natural cycle.” McKnight’s original vision encompassed preserving water quality and open spaces (nearly one-fifth of Jonathan’s land was set aside for this), mitigating air and noise pollution, coordinating roads with the topography, and limiting industry to specific zones. “We’re not just starting with woods and open spaces,” announced McKnight in 1972 as construction began to transform the countryside.

“Welcome to our town,” said McKnight in 1969, “each in his own way, to concentrate on improving the quality of our environment.” What was needed, he continued, was “a sense of dedication, a sense of deep commitment, to protect and enhance our natural resources before our planet becomes unlivable.”

McKnight had a longstanding interest in the environment. Born in 1913 in Minneapolis, he graduated in 1936 from Yale, then served with distinction in the U.S. Navy during World War II, rising to the rank of lieutenant commander. During the Eisenhower administration, McKnight was a member of the president’s National Agricultural Advisory Commission. He was first elected to the Minnesota Senate in 1962, representing a western Hennepin County district.

As senator, McKnight worked from the outset on conservation issues. He was chief Senate author of the Omnibus Natural Resources and Recreation Act of 1963, which added 11 new state parks and created the Outdoor Recreation Resources Commission that, among other things, established the state’s historic-sites program. He also was active in, or chairman of, a broad range of state and local civic organizations.

In December 1969, McKnight announced he would leave the legislature in order to devote his time more fully to conservation issues and the Jonathan project. He underwent emergency surgery in November 1972 for a brain tumor and died the following month, age 59.
Throughout the system are picnic and playground areas, all designed to fit in with the landscape. Nearby are the woods. Images of nature and open spaces featured prominently in sales materials.13

A second concept was the development of community, informal as well as formal, explained as “the fostering of interaction and participation between residents on every level.” Jonathan Development Corporation officials, led by McKnight, envisioned residents building a sense of community through their “basic living module” or “village.” Villages would provide numerous opportunities for interaction in day-to-day activities—at parks and recreation areas, schools, in cohesive neighborhoods, theaters, and art groups dispersed throughout each location.14

Original plans called for five of these villages, conceived of as separate communities of approximately 7,000 people and offering a variety of housing styles and sizes. Each would serve residents with its own infrastructure, including schools, shopping, a medical clinic, and post office. McKnight believed these smaller population centers, modeled on Reston’s, would better facilitate citizen interaction and communication, hallmarks of community.15

The villages would be arranged around a town-center complex, which would contain major retail, entertainment, and service facilities as well as proposed transportation links to the Twin Cities and surrounding locations. Construction of housing units began in 1970 with a single community, Village One, which was laid out and designed according to plan.

Adjacent to the town center was the final piece of the matrix: industry. While living in harmony with nature was of paramount importance to McKnight, he also recognized the need to create employment and generate a tax base. Lacking these two pieces, Jonathan would be little more than another of the typical postwar residential suburbs he rejected. But McKnight drew up rigid standards for the types of business he preferred; a primary concern was pollution control, which eliminated many traditional manufacturing firms.16

Nevertheless, he was optimistic that companies would want to locate in Jonathan. And early indications were that McKnight might be right: By early 1970, with house construction just starting, a half-dozen companies employing about 100 people had already opened in the Jonathan Industry Center. Two years later, McKnight claimed 15 businesses with some 500 employees for the community. While some of these companies had a regional or national presence, such as Kallestad Laboratories (later Diagnostics), Westin Industries, and International Timesharing Corporation, most were small-to-medium-sized local businesses. Although it is not clear what percentage of their employees lived in Jonathan, business development grew faster than housing, so many workers surely commuted from other locations. Indeed, only 369 housing units had been occupied by the end of 1972, falling well short of the target of 494.17

“We’re not just starting with woods and open spaces. We’ll be ending with them, too.”

Jonathan Design Group’s plan for the development, 1971; labels added for clarity.
Connected to the concept of community was the developers’ goal of attracting people of all income strata by offering multiple housing styles, sizes, and prices, both for sale and for rent. “The attitude at Jonathan,” proclaimed the 1971 promotional book, “is that any person who works in Jonathan should be able to live in Jonathan, no matter what his income.”

To accommodate upper-, middle-, and lower-income residents, JDC planners sought new housing solutions. They established partnerships with three private corporations and the Stanford Research Institute to “bring about exciting innovations in housing designs and systems.” As a result, a Washington Post reporter noted after a visit in 1975, “Jonathan is dotted with striking, unusual houses.” One curious idea was the tree-loft apartment complex, with buildings constructed on stilts and units arranged vertically, including a bedroom hung as a balcony over the living space.

For lower-income residents, row-house apartments helped keep rents more affordable, and JDC offered some monthly rent subsidies to broaden the appeal. Other ideas included what the corporation termed “new management concepts,” such as renting household appliances, and prefabricated “stacking units” that could be produced at lower overall cost. To attract middle-income families of relatively modest means, plans called for flexible modular units, which could be added or removed from a core structure depending on family needs, and single-family homes of various sizes.

The JDC used cutting-edge design in an attempt to attract wealthier homebuyers. For example, star architect Ralph Rapson, the influential head of the architecture school at the University of Minnesota and lead on the controversial Cedar-Riverside Plaza complex in Minneapolis, designed a model home for Jonathan, the Red Cedar House. Commissioned in 1968 by the Weyerhaeuser Company as a showcase for its wood products, the house’s angular lines, open, modernist design, inverted truss roof, and earth-toned exterior made a striking statement.

The third and final key concept of the Jonathan design was McKnight’s desire to harness existing and future technology for the common good, specifically by employing a visionary electronic-communication network to serve education and health care. For education, this included ensuring that freedom of information “be-
comes a basic right” with plans for a two-way telecommunications system to enable learning anytime, even from home. This idea remained at concept stage, but by 1973–74 there were tangible results in the medical field. A system of “televised consultations” allowed the Jonathan Lakeview Clinic to consult with doctors at the hospital in Waconia.22

Technology was also foreseen as a necessary part in developing transportation options beyond the automobile. While accepting that cars would predominate, Jonathan plans called for pursuing local and regional mass-transportation links. And McKnight’s dreams in the late 1960s design period went so far as proposing belt-driven sidewalks, emission-free mini cars, boats, and even helicopters, although none of these made it off the drawing board.23

*Ralph Rapson’s Red Cedar House design, 1968 (below). The living room ceiling’s slope is created by the inverted roof truss.*
McKnight had announced the Jonathan project in 1967, and that year the first power and water lines were laid. The first houses followed a year later. These initial units, several hundred, sold briskly, and soon Village One was more than half completed. 

Visitors, prospective buyers, and businesses could see tangible results. Jonathan seemed on its way.

But to move toward the ambitious goals identified in the original plans—more than 15,000 units completed within 20 years—would require assistance beyond funding from the initial investors. So, the HUD financing program announced in 1970 was timely. Because Jonathan was already established, its developers were quickly able to apply for HUD monies. Indeed, Jonathan was the first new community nationwide that HUD selected for financial assistance under the legislation.

From the perspective of the JDC, the timing was ideal.

HUD support for Jonathan consisted of guarantees for up to $21 million of debt obligations over a ten-year period, to assist with land purchase and infrastructure development. But these funds came with certain conditions: one was “to accept a larger percentage of housing for low-income families than had originally been intended,” a 1972 report noted. By accepting the funds, the JDC and McKnight demonstrated their belief that the positives outweighed the negatives. Still, the requirements brought modifications to the original 1967 concept—after construction had already started.

But with land acquired, structures erected, and government backing in place, it was not hard to imagine McKnight’s dream becoming reality in the gently rolling countryside southwest of the Twin Cities. Promotional literature from 1971 projected steady, incremental growth. Visitors shared favorable reviews, and an outside organization noted that, while there were some problems to iron out—such as the relationship between Jonathan and Chaska, questions of taxation, and the local farming population’s fears of being “overwhelmed by urban people”—Jonathan offered positive lessons for new communities, their inhabitants, developers, and the surrounding area.

In sum, as the new decade began, Jonathan was a new-town project that appeared headed for success.

Only that’s not how it turned out. Fiscal clouds were on the horizon at Jonathan as early as 1971 and became darker as time passed. By the mid-1970s, the new town had run out of money and construction had essentially halted. In 1978 HUD foreclosed on Jonathan. Some of the challenges were related to HUD and
the new communities in general, but others were specific to Jonathan.

HUD’s failure to provide a clear definition of a new community quickly became problematic. From the outset, Congress had charged the agency with determining what qualified for funding, but HUD only specified general restrictions about land-use planning, the environment, and job provision. Thus, the new-communities program neither acquired its own profile nor projected one. Some potential private investors were left puzzled. In addition, the loose guidelines encouraged a veritable flood of applications that washed over HUD, but many of the 100-plus proposed “new communities” proved to be little more than standard subdivisions with bike paths grafted on. Even the 15 that were approved had little in common.28 Jonathan’s image suffered as a result: guilt by association.

Innovative architecture featured prominently in some of the 15 new communities, among them Jonathan.
McKnight envisioned and then offered a variety of sizes and styles of houses. But while some buyers prized these options, the vast majority did not. There was "sales resistance among prospective residents previously conditioned to think of the traditional single-family subdivision as the American dream," the Washington Post reported. In other words, most home buyers just did not want sleek modernist designs, flexible modular structures, stacked pre-fab units, or houses built into the trees. McKnight had badly misjudged on this key question.

And this misjudgment had a domino effect. Lower sales figures for futuristic housing models meant increased unit costs for the ones that did sell. That problem was compounded by the builders’ need to deviate from standard construction techniques perfected for conventional subdivisions. To keep prices competitive, as one observer noted as early as 1971, certain corners were cut, more higher-priced single-family houses were constructed, and the row-house apartments for lower-income groups were "obviously inferior in design and construction to the rest of the community and are isolated in a remote corner of the project." The quality of the row-house apartments and, especially, their location strongly suggest that integrating buyers of different income groups was never a priority. JDC planners had dutifully modified the 1967 design, adding more low-income units as HUD required in order to qualify for funds. But in explaining where these apartments had been placed, JDC vice president and general manager Robert J. Dahlin confessed, "We are realists enough to say that people probably want to live next door to somebody like them." Part series on the floundering towns. "They borrowed heavily to acquire, grade and improve land, pay their planners, start construction and sell their product." And due to the high inflation of the early-to-mid-1970s, "It all cost much more than they expected, and because of the nationwide housing slump and the general economic recession, both residential and industrial sales . . . lagged behind their projections." As a result, many new communities struggled to pay their bills. Jonathan proved no exception.

Indeed, funding proved to be the largest challenge for all 15 new communities. According to the Legal Times of Washington, "Despite the clear intentions of Congress that a variety of types of assistance be provided . . . only those related to loan guarantees were ever implemented," and these guarantees were limited to land acquisition and development. Additionally, continuity of commitment was lacking from both the federal and local governments. Finally, in 1973, the Nixon administration, which had overseen the early years of the program, issued a moratorium that effectively ended federal housing and community-development funds.

Developers were then forced to rely increasingly on home sales to generate income—and to do so in a poor business climate, a difficult task, at best. Jonathan's financial woes were compounded by McKnight’s sudden death in December 1972. McKnight was an energetic visionary, a man able to attract investors and silence skeptics. His drive and personal involvement at all levels proved a major reason for the early success of Jonathan. His death left a vacuum that was never filled. McKnight’s successors kept the project afloat for several more years but, lacking his determined leadership qualities as well as access to the required financial means, they ultimately were unable to save it.

Problems had intensified by November 1974, when the Jonathan Development Corporation was unable to make a $468,000 interest payment on its HUD bonds. In February 1975 it sold 2,400 acres of agricultural land in order to pay creditors, and by summer, a Philadelphia-based building firm was negotiating with HUD to manage what was left of the community. But as the U.S. housing market continued depressed, possible solutions for Jonathan remained stillborn and debts mounted. HUD finally acted: in mid-1976 the agency announced it would take direct control of Jonathan and in January 1977 made pub-
lic its decision to foreclose on the Jonathan Development Corporation, an action it took in August 1978.35 While pieces of Jonathan remained and negotiations dragged on into the 1980s, HUD had effectively closed the book on Henry T. McKnight’s ambitious plans.

But foreclosure did not close the book on the people who lived there. By 1980 Jonathan was home to about 3,000 residents living on some 1,500 acres—a far cry from the heady predictions, just a decade earlier, of 50,000 in five fully developed villages sprawled over 5,000 acres. The town-center megastructure remained on the drawing board, and the hoped-for mass transit connections to the Twin Cities failed to materialize. Still, Jonathan residents interviewed in 1980 chose to reflect on their community’s positive aspects. “One of the reasons people who live here consider it successful,” said Maggie Brown, who moved to Jonathan with her family in 1968, “is that they care. . . . There’s something special here.”36

Today, the remnants of Jonathan exist as part of Chaska near the Minnesota Landscape Arboretum and the Hazeltine National Golf Club. Ironically, the 2010 population of Chaska—including Jonathan—is just under 24,000, less than half the size that 1967’s original plan had projected for Jonathan alone. Henry McKnight’s grand idea ultimately remained just that.

Notes
1. Minneapolis Star, Aug. 1, 1967, 1A. Both the community and the county were named for eighteenth-century explorer Jonathan Carver.
5. Johnson quoted in Legal Times of Washington, Apr. 7, 1980, 10; Cathy D. Knepper, Greenbelt, Maryland: A Living Legacy of the New Deal (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2001), xiii–xvii,
If you think you may need permission, here are some guidelines:

**Students and researchers**
- You do not need permission to quote or paraphrase portions of an article, as long as your work falls within the fair use provision of copyright law. Using information from an article to develop an argument is fair use. Quoting brief pieces of text in an unpublished paper or thesis is fair use. Even quoting in a work to be published can be fair use, depending on the amount quoted. Read about fair use here: [http://www.copyright.gov/fls/fl102.html](http://www.copyright.gov/fls/fl102.html)
- You should, however, always credit the article as a source for your work.

**Teachers**
- You do not need permission to incorporate parts of an article into a lesson.
- You do need permission to assign an article, either by downloading multiple copies or by sending students to the online pdf. There is a small per-copy use fee for assigned reading. [Contact us](mailto:contactus@mnhs.org) for more information.

**About Illustrations**
- Minnesota History credits the sources for illustrations at the end of each article. Minnesota History itself does not hold copyright on images and therefore cannot grant permission to reproduce them.
- For information on using illustrations owned by the Minnesota Historical Society, see [MHS Library FAQ](http://www.mnhs.org/mnhistory).