

THE PERSISTENCE OF POPULISM¹

Early in 1890, when the People's party was yet in the embryo stage, a farmer editor from the West set forth the doctrine that "The Cranks Always Win." As he saw it,

The cranks are those who do not accept the existing order of things, and propose to change them. The existing order of things is always accepted by the majority, therefore the cranks are always in the minority. They are always progressive thinkers and always in advance of their time, and they always win. Called fanatics and fools at first, they are sometimes persecuted and abused. But their reforms are generally righteous, and time, reason and argument bring men to their side. Abused and ridiculed, then tolerated, then respectfully given a hearing, then supported. This has been the gauntlet that all great reforms and reformers have run, from Gallileo to John Brown.

The writer of this editorial may have overstated his case, but a backward glance at the history of Populism shows that many of the reforms that the Populists demanded, while despised and rejected for a season, won out triumphantly in the end. The party itself did not survive, nor did many of its leaders, although the number of contemporary politicians whose es-cutcheons should bear the bend sinister of Populism is larger than might be supposed; but Populistic doctrines showed an amazing vitality.

In formulating their principles the Populists reasoned that the ordinary, honest, willing American worker, be he farmer or be he laborer, might expect in this land of opportunity not only the chance to work, but also as the rightful reward of his labor a fair degree of prosperity. When, in the later eighties

¹ This paper was read on January 19 as the annual address of the eighty-second annual meeting of the Minnesota Historical Society. It will be included, with annotations, as a chapter in Dr. Hicks's book on "The Populist Revolt: A History of the Farmers' Alliance and the People's Party," which is soon to be published by the University of Minnesota Press. *Ed.*

and in the "heart-breaking nineties," hundreds of thousands — perhaps millions — of men found themselves either without work to do, or having work, unable to pay their just debts and make a living, the Populists held that there must be "wrong and crime and fraud somewhere." What was more natural than to fix the blame for this situation upon the manufacturers, the railroads, the money-lenders, the middlemen — plutocrats all, whose "colossal fortunes, unprecedented in the history of mankind" grew ever greater while the multitudes came to know the meaning of want? Work was denied when work might well be given, and "the fruits of the toil of millions were boldly stolen."

And the remedy? In an earlier age the hard-pressed farmers and laborers might have fled to free farms in the seemingly limitless lands of the West, but now the era of free lands had passed. Where, then, might they look for help? Where, if not to the government, which alone had the power to bring the mighty oppressors of the people to bay? So to the government the Populists turned. From it they asked laws to insure a full redress of grievances. As Professor Frederick J. Turner puts it, "the defenses of the pioneer democrat began to shift from free land to legislation, from the ideal of individualism to the ideal of social control through regulation by law." Unfortunately, however, the agencies of government had been permitted to fall into the hands of the plutocrats. Hence, if the necessary corrective legislation were to be obtained, the people must first win control of their government. The Populist philosophy thus boiled down finally to two fundamental propositions: one, that the government must restrain the selfish tendencies of those who profited at the expense of the poor and needy; the other, that the people, not the plutocrats, must control the government.

In their efforts to remove all restrictions on the power of the people to rule the Populists accepted as their own a wide range of reforms. They believed, and on this they had fre-

quently enough the evidence of their own eyes, that corruption existed at the ballot box and that a fair count was often denied. They fell in, therefore, with great enthusiasm when agitators, who were not necessarily Populists, sought to popularize the Australian ballot and such other measures as were calculated to insure a true expression of the will of the people. Believing as they did that the voice of the people was the voice of God, they sought to eliminate indirect elections, especially the election of United States senators by state legislatures and the president and the vice president by an electoral college. Fully aware of the habits of party bosses in manipulating nominating conventions, the Populists veered more and more toward direct primary elections, urging in some of their later platforms that nominations even for president and vice president should be made by direct vote. Woman suffrage was a delicate question, for it was closely identified with the politically hazardous matter of temperance legislation, but, after all, the idea of votes for women was so clearly in line with the Populist doctrine of popular rule that it could not logically be denied a place among genuinely Populistic reforms. Direct legislation through the initiative and referendum and through the easy amendment of state constitutions naturally appealed strongly to the Populists — the more so as they saw legislatures fail repeatedly to enact reform laws to which a majority of their members had been definitely pledged. "A majority of the people," declared the Sioux Falls convention, "can never be corruptly influenced." The recall of faithless officials, even judges, also attracted favorable attention from the makers of later Populist platforms.

To list these demands is to cite the chief political departures made in the United States during recent times. The Australian system of voting, improved registration laws, and other devices for insuring "a free ballot and a fair count" have long since swept the country. Woman suffrage has won an unqualified victory. The election of United States senators by

direct vote of the people received the approval of far more than two-thirds of the national House of Representatives as early as 1898; it was further foreshadowed by the adoption in a number of states, beginning in 1904, of senatorial primaries the results of which were to be regarded as morally binding upon the legislatures concerned; and it became a fact in 1913 with the ratification of the seventeenth amendment to the Constitution. The direct election of president and vice president was hard to reconcile with state control of the election machinery and state definition of the right to vote, hence this reform never caught on; but the danger of one presidential candidate receiving a majority of the popular vote and another a majority of the electoral vote, as was the case in the Cleveland-Harrison contest of 1888, seems definitely to have passed. Late elections may not prove that the popular voice always speaks intelligently; but they do seem to show that it speaks decisively. In the widespread use of the primary election for the making of party nominations, the Populist principle of popular rule has scored perhaps its most telling victory. Benjamin R. Tillman urged this reform in South Carolina at a very early date, but on obtaining control of the Democratic political machine of his state, he hesitated to give up the power which the convention system placed in his hands. At length, however, in 1896 he allowed the reform to go through. Wisconsin, spurred on by the La Follette forces, adopted the direct primary plan of nominations in 1903, and thereafter the other states of the Union, with remarkably few exceptions, fell into line. Presidential preference primaries, through which it was hoped that the direct voice of the people could be heard in the making of nominations for president and vice president, were also adopted by a number of states, beginning with Oregon in 1910. Direct legislation by the people became almost an obsession with the Populists, especially the middle-of-the-road faction, in whose platforms it tended to overshadow nearly every other issue; and it is perhaps significant that the initiative and referendum

were adopted by South Dakota, a state in which the Populist party had shown great strength, as close on the heels of the Populist movement as 1898. Other states soon followed the South Dakota lead, and particularly in Oregon the experiment of popular legislation was given a thorough trial. New constitutions and numerous amendments to old constitutions tended also to introduce much popularly made law, the idea that legislation in a constitution is improper and unwise receiving perhaps its most shattering blow when an Oklahoma convention wrote for that state a constitution of fifty thousand words. The recall of elected officials has been applied chiefly in municipal affairs, but some states also permit its use for state officers and a few allow even judges, traditionally held to be immune from popular reactions, to be subjected to recall. Thus many of the favorite ideas of the Populists, ideas which had once been "abused and ridiculed," were presently "respectfully given a hearing, then supported."

Quite apart from these changes in the American form of government, the populist propaganda in favor of independent voting did much to undermine the intense party loyalties that had followed in the wake of the Civil War. The time had been when for the Republican voter "To doubt Grant was as bad as to doubt Christ," when the man who scratched his party ticket was regarded as little if any better than the traitor to his country. The Farmers' Alliance in its day had sought earnestly to wean the partisan voter over to independence. It had urged its members to "favor and assist to office such candidates only as are thoroughly identified with our principles and who will insist on such legislation as shall make them effective." And in this regard the Alliance, as some of its leaders boasted, had been a "great educator of the people." The Populist party had to go even further, for its growth depended almost wholly upon its ability to bring voters to a complete renunciation of old party loyalties. Since at one time or another well over a million men cast their ballots for Populist

tickets, the loosening of party ties that thus set in was of formidable proportions. Indeed, the man who became a Populist learned his lesson almost too well. When confronted, as many Populist voters thought themselves to be in 1896, with a choice between loyalty to party and loyalty to principle, the third-party adherent generally tended to stand on principle. Thereafter, as Populism faded out, the men who once had sworn undying devotion to the Omaha platform were compelled again to transfer their allegiance. Many Republicans became Democrats via the Populist route; many Democrats became Republicans. Probably, however, most of the Populists returned to the parties from which they had withdrawn, but party ties, once broken, were not so strong as they had been before. The rapid passing of voters from one party to another and the wholesale scratching of ballots, so characteristic of voting today, are distinctly reminiscent of Populism; as are also the frequent nonpartisan ballots by which judges, city commissioners, and other officers are now chosen wholly without regard to their party affiliations.

In the South the Populist demands for popular government produced a peculiar situation. To a very great extent the southern Populists were recruited from the rural classes, which had hitherto been politically inarticulate. Through the Populist party the "wool hat boys" from the country sought to obtain the weight in southern politics that their numbers warranted but that the "Bourbon" dynasties had ever denied them. In the struggle that ensued both sides made every possible use of the Negro vote, and the bugaboo of Negro domination was once again raised. Indeed, the experience of North Carolina under a combination government of Populists and Republicans furnished concrete evidence of what might happen should the political power of the Negro be restored. Under the circumstances, therefore, there seemed to be nothing for the white Populists to do but to return to their former allegiance until the menace of the Negro voter could be removed. With the

Democratic party again supreme, the problem of Negro voting was attacked with right good will. Indeed, as early as 1890 the state of Mississippi, stimulated no doubt by the agitation over the Force Bill, adopted a constitution which fixed as a prerequisite for voting two years' residence in the state and one year's residence in the district or town. This provision, together with a poll tax that had to be paid far in advance of the dates set for elections, diminished appreciably the number of Negro voters, among whom indigence was common and the migratory propensity well developed. To complete the work of disfranchisement an amendment was added to the Mississippi constitution in 1892 which called for a modified literacy test that could be administered in such a way as to permit illiterate whites to vote, while discriminating against illiterate, or even literate blacks. The Tillmanites in South Carolina found legal means to exclude the Negro voter in 1895; Louisiana introduced her famous "grandfather clause" in 1898; North Carolina adopted residence, poll tax, and educational qualifications in 1900; Alabama followed in 1901; and in their own good time the other southern states in which Negro voters had constituted a serious problem did the same thing. Some reverses were experienced in the courts, but the net result of this epidemic of anti-Negro suffrage legislation was to eliminate for the time being all danger that Negro voters might play an important part in southern politics.

With this problem out of the way, or at least in process of solution, it became possible for the rural whites of the South to resume the struggle for a voice in public affairs that they had begun in the days of the Alliance and had continued under the banner of Populism. They did not form again a third party, but they did contest freely at the Democratic primaries against the respectable and conservative descendants of the "Bourbons." The Tillman machine in South Carolina continued to function smoothly for years as the agency through which the poorer classes sought to dominate the government

of that state. It regularly sent Tillman to the United States Senate, where after his death his spirit lived on in the person of Cole Blease. In Georgia the struggle for supremacy between the two factions of the Democratic party was a chronic condition with now one side and now the other in control. Ex-Populists, converted by the lapse of time into regular organization Democrats, won high office and instituted many of the reforms for which they had formerly been defamed. Even Tom Watson rose from his political deathbed to show amazing strength in a race for Congress in 1918 and to win an astounding victory two years later when he sought a seat in the United States Senate. For better or for worse, the political careers of such southern politicians as James K. Vardaman of Mississippi, the Honorable Jeff Davis of Arkansas, and Huey P. Long of Louisiana demonstrate conclusively the fact that the lower classes in the South can and sometimes do place men of their own kind and choosing in high office. In these later days rural whites, who fought during Populist times with only such support as they could obtain from Republican sources, have sometimes been able to count as allies the mill operatives and their sympathizers in the factory districts; and southern primary elections are now apt to be as exciting as the regular elections are tame. Populism may have had something to do with the withdrawal of political power from the southern Negro, but it also paved the way for the political emancipation of the lower-class southern whites.

The control of the government by the people was for the thoughtful Populist merely a means to an end. The next step was to use the power of the government to check the iniquities of the plutocrats. The Populists at Omaha, when they were baffled by the insistence of the temperance forces, pointed out that before this or any other such reform could be accomplished they must "ask all men to first help us to determine whether we are to have a republic to administer." The inference is clear. Once permit the people really to rule, once insure that

the men in office would not or could not betray the popular will, and such regulative measures as would right the wrongs from which the people suffered would quickly follow. The Populists believed implicitly in the ability of the people to frame and enforce the measures necessary to redeem themselves from the various sorts of oppression that were being visited upon them. They catalogued the evils in their platforms and suggested the specific remedies by which these evils were to be overcome.

Much unfair criticism has been leveled at the Populists because of the attitude they took toward the allied subjects of banking and currency. One would think from the contemporary anti-Populist diatribes and from many subsequent criticisms of the Populist financial program that in such matters the third-party economists were little better than raving maniacs. As a matter of fact, the old-school Populists could think about as straight as their opponents. Their newspapers were well edited and the arguments therein presented usually held together. Populist literature, moreover, was widely and carefully read by the ordinary third-party voters, particularly by the western farmers, whose periods of enforced leisure gave them ample opportunity for reading and reflection. Old party debaters did not tackle lightly their Populist antagonists, and as frequently as not the bewhiskered rustic, turned orator, could present in support of his arguments an array of carefully sorted information that left his better-groomed opponent in a daze. The injection of the somewhat irrelevant silver issue considerably confused Populist thinking, but, even so, many of the "old-timers" kept their heads and put silver in its proper place.

The Populists observed with entire accuracy that the currency of the United States was both inadequate and inelastic. They criticized correctly the part played by the national banking system in currency matters as irresponsible and susceptible of manipulation in the interest of the creditor class.

They demanded a stabilized dollar and they believed that it could be obtained if a national currency "safe, sound, and flexible" should be issued direct to the people by the government itself in such quantities as the reasonable demands of business should dictate. Silver and gold might be issued as well as paper, but the value of the dollar should come from the fiat of government and not from the "intrinsic worth" of the metal. It is interesting to note that since the time when Populists were condemned as lunatics for holding such views legislation has been adopted which, while by no means going the full length of a straight-out paper currency, does seek to accomplish precisely the ends that the Populists had in mind. Populist and free silver agitation forced economists to study the money question as they had never studied it before and ultimately led them to propose remedies that could run the gauntlet of public opinion and of Congress. The Aldrich-Vreeland Act of 1908 authorized an emergency currency of several hundred million dollars to be lent to banks on approved securities in times of financial disturbance. A National Monetary Commission, created at the same time, reported after four years' intensive study in favor of a return to the Hamiltonian system of a central bank of the United States; but Congress in 1914, under Wilson's leadership, adopted instead the Federal Reserve system. The Federal Reserve Act did not, indeed, destroy the national banks and avoid the intervention of bankers in all monetary matters; but it did make possible an adequate and elastic national currency varying in accordance with the needs of the country, and it placed supreme control of the nation's banking and credit resources into the hands of a Federal Reserve Board, appointed, not by the bankers, but by the president of the United States with the consent of the Senate. The Populist diagnosis had been accepted and the Populist prescription had not been wholly ignored.

Probably no item in the Populist creed received more thorough castigation at the hands of contemporaries than the

demand for subtreasuries, or government warehouses for the private storage of grain; but the subtreasury idea was not all bad, and perhaps the Populists would have done well had they pursued it farther than they did. The need that the subtreasury was designed to meet was very real. Lack of credit forced the farmer to sell his produce at the time of harvest when the price was lowest. A cash loan on his crop that would enable him to hold it until prices should rise was all that he asked. Prices might thus be stabilized; profits honestly earned by the farmers would no longer fall to the speculators. That the men who brought forward the subtreasury as a plan for obtaining short-term rural credits also loaded it with an unworkable plan for obtaining a flexible currency was unfortunate; but the fundamental principle of the bill has by no means been discredited. Indeed, the Warehouse Act of 1916 went far toward accomplishing the very thing the Populists demanded. Under it the United States department of agriculture was permitted to license warehousemen and authorize them to receive, weigh, and grade farm products, for which they might issue warehouse receipts as collateral. Thus the owner might borrow the money he needed; not, however, from the government of the United States.

In addition to the credits that the subtreasury would provide, Populist platforms usually urged also that the national government lend money on farm lands directly at a low rate of interest. This demand, which received at the time an infinite amount of condemnation and derision, has since been treated with much deference. If the government does not now print paper money to lend the farmer with his land as security, it nevertheless does stand back of an elaborate system of banks through which he may obtain the credit he needs. Under the terms of the Federal Reserve Act national banks may lend money on farm mortgages — a privilege not enjoyed in Populist times — and agricultural paper running as long as

six months may be rediscounted by the Federal Reserve Banks. From the Farm Loan Banks, created by an act of 1916, the farmers may borrow for long periods sums not exceeding fifty per cent of the value of their land and twenty per cent of the value of their permanent improvements. Finally, through still another series of banks — the Federal Intermediate Credit Banks, established by an act of 1923 — loans are made available to carry the farmer from one season to the next, or a little longer, should occasion demand; the intermediate banks were authorized to rediscount agricultural and livestock paper for periods of six months to three years. Thus the government has created a comprehensive system of rural credits through which the farmer may obtain short-term loans, loans of intermediate duration, or long-term loans, whichever his needs require, with the minimum of difficulty and at minimum interest rates. It would be idle to indulge in a *post hoc* argument to try to prove that all these developments were due to Populism; but the intensive study of agricultural problems that led ultimately to these measures did begin with the efforts of sound economists to answer the arguments of the Populists. And it is evident that in the end the economists conceded nearly every point for which the Populists had contended.

More recent attempts to solve the agricultural problem, while assuming the responsibility of the government in the matter as readily as even a Populist could have asked, have progressed beyond the old Populist panacea of easy credit. Agricultural economists now have their attention fixed upon the surplus as the root of the difficulty. In industry production can be curtailed to meet the demands of any given time and a glutted market with the attendant decline of prices can in a measure be forestalled. But in agriculture, where each farmer is a law unto himself and where crop yields must inevitably vary greatly from year to year, control of production is well-nigh impossible and a surplus may easily become chronic. Suggestions for relief therefore looked increasingly toward

the disposal of this surplus to the greatest advantage. The various McNary-Haugen bills that came before Congress in recent years proposed to create a federal board through which the margin above domestic needs in years of plenty should be purchased and held or disposed of abroad at whatever price it would bring. Through an "equalization fee" the losses sustained by "dumping" the surplus in this fashion were to be charged back upon the producers benefited. This proposition, while agreeable to a majority of both houses of Congress, met opposition from two successive presidents, Coolidge and Hoover, and was finally set aside for another scheme, less "socialistic." In 1929 Congress passed and the president signed a law for the creation of an appointive Federal Farm Board whose duty it is, among other things, to encourage the organization of coöperative societies through which the farmers themselves may deal with the problem of the surplus. In case of necessity, however, the board may take the lead in the formation of stabilization corporations which under its strict supervision may buy up such seasonal or temporary surpluses as threaten to break the market and hold them for higher prices. A huge revolving fund, appropriated by Congress, is made available for the purpose, loans from this fund being obtainable by the stabilization corporations at low interest rates. There is much about this thoroughly respectable and conservative law that recalls the agrarian demands of the nineties. Indeed, the measure goes farther in the direction of government recognition and aid to the principle of agricultural coöperation than even the most erratic Allianceman could have dared to hope. Perhaps it will prove to be the "better plan" that the farmers called for in vain when the subtreasury was the best idea they could present.

To the middle-western Populist the railway problem was as important as any other — perhaps most important of all. Early Alliance platforms favored drastic governmental control of the various means of communication as the best possible remedy

for the ills from which the people suffered, and the first Populist platform to be written called for government ownership and operation only in case "the most rigid, honest, and just national control and supervision" should fail to remove the "abuses now existing." Thereafter the Populists usually demanded government ownership; although it is clear enough from their state and local platforms and from the votes and actions of Populist officeholders that, pending the day when ownership should become a fact, regulation by state and nation must be made ever more effective. Possibly government ownership is no nearer today than in Populist times, but the first objective of the Populists, "the most rigid, honest and just national control," is as nearly an accomplished fact as carefully drawn legislation and highly efficient administration can make it. Populist misgivings about governmental control arose from the knowledge that the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, as well as most regulatory state legislation, was wholly ineffectual during the nineties; but beginning with the Elkins Act of 1903, which struck at the practice of granting rebates, a long series of really workable laws found its way upon the statute books. The Hepburn Act of 1906, the Mann-Elkins Act of 1910, and the Transportation Act of 1920, not to mention lesser laws, placed the Interstate Commerce Commission upon a high pinnacle of power. State laws, keeping abreast of the national program, supplemented national control with state control; and through one or the other agency most of the specific grievances of which the Populists had complained were removed. The arbitrary fixing of rates by the carriers, a commonplace in Populist times, is virtually unknown today. If discriminations still exist as between persons and places the Interstate Commerce Commission is likely to be as much to blame as the railroads. Free passes, so numerous in Populist times as to occasion the remark that the only people who did not have passes were those who could not afford to pay their own fare, have virtually ceased to exist, except for railway

employees. Railway control of state governments, even in the old "Granger" states, where in earlier days party bosses took their orders direct from railway officials, has long since become a thing of the past. The railroads still may have an influence in politics, but the railroads do not rule. Governmental control of telephones, telegraphs, and pipe lines, together with such later developments as radio and the transmission of electric power, is accepted today as a matter of course, the issues being merely to what extent control should go and through what agencies it should be accomplished.

For the trust problem, as distinguished from the railroad problem, the Populists had no very definite solution. They agreed, however, that the power of government, state and national, should be used in such a way as to prevent "individuals or corporations fastening themselves, like vampires, on the people and sucking their substance." Antitrust laws received the earnest approval of Alliancemen and Populists and were often initiated by them. The failure of such laws to secure results was laid mainly at the door of the courts, and when Theodore Roosevelt in 1904 succeeded in securing an order from the United States Supreme Court dissolving the Northern Securities Company, it was hailed as a great victory for Populist principles. Many other incidental victories were won. Postal savings banks "for the safe deposit of the earnings of the people" encroached upon the special privileges of the bankers. An amendment to the national constitution in 1913, authorizing income taxes, recalled a decision of the Supreme Court that the Populists in their day had cited as the best evidence of the control of the government by the trusts; and income and inheritance taxes have ever since been levied. The reform of state and local taxation so as to exact a greater proportion of the taxes from the trusts and those who profit from them has also been freely undertaken. Labor demands, such as the right of labor to organize, the eight-hour day, limitation on the use of injunctions in labor disputes, and

restrictions on immigration, were strongly championed by the Populists as fit measures for curbing the power of the trusts and were presently treated with great consideration. The Clayton Antitrust Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act, passed during the Wilson régime, were the products of long experience with the trust problem. The manner in which these laws have been enforced, however, would seem to indicate that the destruction of the trusts, a common demand in Populist times, is no longer regarded as feasible and that by government control the interests of the people can best be conserved.

On the land question the Populist demands distinctly foreshadowed conservation. "The land," according to the Omaha declaration, "including all the natural resources of wealth, is the heritage of all the people and should not be monopolized for speculative purposes." Land and resources already given away were of course difficult to get back and the passing of the era of free lands could not be stopped by law; but President Roosevelt soon began to secure results in the way of the reclamation and irrigation of arid western lands, the enlargement and protection of the national forests, the improvement of internal waterways, and the withdrawal from entry of lands bearing mineral wealth such as coal, oil, and phosphates. At regular intervals since 1908 the governors of the states have met in conference to discuss the conservation problem, and this one-time dangerous Populist doctrine has now won all but universal acceptance.

It would thus appear that much of the Populist program has found favor in the eyes of later generations. Populist plans for altering the machinery of government with but few exceptions have been carried into effect. Referring to these belated victories of the Populists, William Allen White — the same who had asked, "What's the matter with Kansas?" — wrote recently, "They abolished the established order completely and ushered in a new order." Thanks to this triumph of Populist principles, one may almost say that in so far as political

devices can insure it, the people now rule. Political dishonesty has not altogether disappeared and the people may yet be betrayed by the men they elect to office, but on the whole the acts of government have come to reflect fairly clearly the will of the people. Efforts to assert this newly won power in such a way as to crush the economic supremacy of the predatory few have also been numerous and not wholly unsuccessful. The gigantic corporations of today, dwarfing into insignificance the trusts of yesterday, are in spite of their size far more circumspect in their conduct than their predecessors. If in the last analysis "big business" controls, it is because it has public opinion on its side, and not merely the party bosses.

To radicals of today, however, the Populist panaceas, based as they were on an essentially individualistic philosophy and designed merely to insure for every man his right to "get ahead" in the world, seem totally inadequate. These latter-day extremists point to the perennial reappearance of such problems as farm relief, unemployment, unfair taxation, and law evasion as evidence that the Populist type of reform is futile, that something more drastic is required. Nor is their contention without point. It is reasonable to suppose that progressivism itself must progress; that the programs which would solve the problems of the one generation might fall far short of solving the problems of a succeeding generation. One may not agree with the contention of some present-day radicals that only a revolution will suffice, and that the very attempt to make existing institutions more tolerable is treason to any real progress, since by so doing the day of revolution may be postponed. But one must recognize that when the old Populist panaceas can receive the enthusiastic support of Hooverian Republicans and Alsmithian Democrats, their once startling reforms have passed from the left to the right and are no longer to be regarded as radical measures at all. One is reminded of the dilemma that Alice of Wonderland fame encountered when she went through the looking-glass. On and

on she ran with the Red Queen, but "however fast they went they never seemed to pass anything."

"Well, in our country," said Alice, still panting a little, "you'd generally get to somewhere else — if you ran very fast for a long time, as we've been doing."

"A slow sort of country!" said the Queen. "Now, *here*, you see, it takes all the running *you* can do to keep in the same place. If you want to get somewhere else, you must run at least twice as fast as that!"

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